| I N TR ODU C TI ON
The informed consent process is the main mechanism through which we protect and enable patients' decision-making. Many states have recognized informed consent for clinical genetic testing as an area warranting special protections, but such laws were generally conceptualized in an era when genetic tests involved targeted analysis for disease and provided specific and limited information about a single variant. Since that time, fundamental advances in genetic technologies-including approaches such as whole genome or exome sequencing, microarrays, and other technologies that allow simultaneous analysis of many genes-have transformed clinical genetic testing. It is therefore critical for genetic counselors, who are often involved in obtaining consent from patients for genetic testing, to consider how best to counsel patients in making good health-care decisions for themselves going forward. Part of addressing that question involves examining whether these laws are adequately tailored toward enabling such conversations.
In general, most of the original clinical genetic testing laws paired requirements for informed consent with protections against nonconsensual use of genetic information. This was motivated by the goal of restricting insurers (especially health insurers) or employers from using genetic information against customer or employee interests (Yesley, 1997) . Given the sweeping changes in the science of genomic testing, this article seeks to assess the adequacy of current genetic-specific state laws on informed consent based on an examination of 15 states.
We undertook this analysis as a subgroup of the Informed Consent and Governance Working Group of the first stage of the Clinical Sequencing Exploratory Research (CSER1) Consortium, which explored challenges to integrating genetic sequencing into clinical settings (Green et al., 2016) .
Past summaries and critiques of state genetic testing laws have generally focused on a specific type or context of genetic testing-for example, whole genome sequencing, health insurance, employment, research -or were completed prior to the development of the most recent genomic technologies (Hakimian, Taube, Bledsoe, & Aamodt, 2004; Hall & Rich, 2000; McEwen & Reilly, 1992; PCSBI, 2012; ; Rothenberg, 1995; Rothenberg et al., 1997) . Here we focus on the current intersection of the law with a wide array of modern testing technologies, and conclude that in many states informed consent laws for clinical genetic testing as currently written pose significant challenges and are not suited to address modern technologies. Although genetic counselors must work within the confines of current law, we recommend that when in gray zones or areas of conflict, they should focus on information that aligns with stated patient values and comports with the spirit of the law:
helping patients make better-informed decisions for themselves and their families. Finally, we recognize that genetic counselors will have an important role to play as advocates for improved statutes. for clinical genetic testing. These statutes arguably not only play the greatest role in shaping day-to-day informed consent disclosures but also create variability for providers across the country. We identified relevant state statutory provisions through the legal search engine LexisNexis Academic, using search terms "genetic OR genomic AND test OR testing," as well as "'genetic information' AND consent OR authorization." We narrowed these findings by including only those that related to genetic material, information, or data. We excluded statutes that only included discrimination protections or "opt-outs" as well as those that did not focus on informed consent to clinical genetic testing. Ten of the 15 CSER states (CA, MD, MA, MI, MN, MO, NY, OR, TN, TX) had laws that met our inclusion criteria (Supporting Information).
| M A TE RI A L S A ND M E TH ODS
Prior to data collection, the authors identified categories of information to be collected. Initially, two authors (KSB, AP) collected data from six pilot states for review. The research team then iteratively organized information into categories based on previous state reviews. Two authors (KSB, AP) then undertook statute identification and data collection. Through a series of group discussions, the team identified areas on which to focus our analysis, relevant critiques, and conclusions.
| RE S U L TS
Here we focus on three areas that we hypothesize would be of most 
| Scope of protections
First we examined the definitions (i.e., "genetic characteristic," "genetic MD. Code Ann., Ins. § 27-909(d), 2016). We found these definitions to be limited in several problematic ways for genetic counselors seeking to explain them in the consent process, including that they focus only on variants known to be associated with disease or negative health effects or variants associated with asymptomatic disease-whereas a genetic counselor's actual practice often goes beyond such limits (Table 1 ).
In five of the states surveyed (CA, MD, MI, MN, TX), the definition of genetic characteristic, test, or predisposition was limited to variants that are known, determined, or scientifically or medically accepted or believed to be associated with disease, disorder, or mutation (Cal. A second-related issue is that even variants that are not medically accepted as being associated with a disorder may be strongly suspected of being pathogenic or may be associated with conditions or behaviors that-while not constituting illnesses-are nevertheless stigmatizing (e.g., the association of the MAOA-L variant with impulsive and antisocial behavior [Fergusson, Boden, Horwood, Miller, & Kennedy, 2011] ). Also, evolving scientific knowledge creates the possibility that the legal status of certain test results might be reclassified in the future (Mahon, 2015) . This is problematic when genetic counselors need to know prospectively which tests are covered by geneticspecific informed consent statutes. A673T in the APP gene, which helps protect against Alzheimer's disease [Jonsson et al., 2012] ). But current genetic technologies frequently yield data about several categories of findings, for example, positive and negative associations with diseases, drug metabolism, nondisease-associated traits, ancestry, and variants of uncertain significance (VUS) or associated with more than one phenotypic condition.
Statutes that limit their scope to disease-associated findings might therefore be difficult to apply when access to or release of the entire data set is in question.
Another limitation of note is that in five states (CA, MD, MA, MN, TX), definitions were limited to genetic characteristics, information, or tests "presently not associated" with symptoms (i.e., protections were limited to persons who were asymptomatic or presymptomatic) or not But not only has this definitional problem yet to be resolved, it has been exacerbated by the advent of genetic technologies employed as diagnostic tools when symptoms already exist, but are of unknown etiology (Saunders et al., 2012) .
| Required disclosures for informed consent
A second area of particular interest is the information that is required to be disclosed during the informed consent process, such as discussion of the nature and purpose of the genetic test (which all states with disclosure requirements mandate). But notably, only four of the states we examined delineate specific disclosure requirements: CA (whose statute uses the term "written authorization," has content similar to other states' informed consent laws and thus was included in our analysis), . Overall, we found that these statutes require disclosure of complex levels of detail, often require descriptions of options for destruction of biospecimens while ignoring the resulting data, and set confusing standards for disclosure regarding authorized parties and future access (Table 2) . However, we note that they also might require provision of written information not only who has access to the sample, but also who has access to the information generated from the sample is critical in light of new technologies as the amount of data that can be generated from a single sample has grown exponentially. The resultant information implicates informed consent discussions not just about privacy risks, but also about benefits as information might be useful to family members, and-through secondary research-could potentially yield family-specific variant discovery.
| Research use and identifiability
The last area we queried is secondary research use of biospecimens and genetic data and information generated in the clinical context. Many of the state laws we analyzed had limitations related to exceptions from informed consent for future research use or destruction requirements targeting specimens as opposed to derived data, or rested their requirements on the data's "identifiability"-a rapidly evolving concept (Table 3) . While reidentification is highly unlikely, this possibility at least challenges the widely held conception of binary categories of "identifiable"
and "de-identified."
| D ISC USSION
Our research focused on three areas of informed consent legislation that are of particular relevance to genetic counselors employing modern genetic testing technologies. We found several areas where these Genetic Information Privacy law due to concerns that an amendment "could be interpreted to prohibit genetic testing facilities, research facilities and even universities from using a third party to store or back up" data (Mead, 2017; Sun, 2017) . Genetic counselors can act as a critical resource for state legislatures, as well as within their institutions, by clarifying how such laws impact patients and families on a daily basis and the complex obligations (e.g., selecting a laboratory, selecting a test, disclosing risks and benefits of that test) that clinicians face.
In conjunction with specific advocacy efforts, uniformity across jurisdictions would also be desirable for clinicians practicing, and specimens traveling, across state lines. But it is unclear whether state legislatures have the bandwidth or expertise to formulate and maintain such updated policies. Incorporation of specific provisions into regulations, rather than embodying them in statutory language-with an appropriate state health agency charged with updating them as needed-may be a more reasonable approach.
Our study had several limitations-most notably that we confined our review to 15 states, all of which have major institutions that conduct genomic research such that they might not be representative of all U.S. states. We have also highlighted what we identified as major issues across these states; other problems may exist within these individual states' laws that we did not review here. We also limited our search terms to focus on clinical genetic testing or information and therefore might have excluded some statutes of potential interest.
Also, informed consent is governed by a complex intersection of statutes, regulations, and case law; here we focused our review on state statutes requiring explicit informed consent to clinical genetic testing.
Despite these limitations, this review provides a valuable perspective on the complexities that can arise in the context of genetic-specific consent laws and rapidly advancing genomic technologies.
While genomic technologies are changing the nature of testing, the goals of clinical informed consent have generally stayed the same:
to inform patients of the potential benefits, risks, implications, and use of tests and data being generated. Science often advances more rapidly than the laws that govern it; genetic-specific clinical informed consent laws must strike a balance between adequate specificity to protect patients and enough flexibility to ensure those continued protections in the context of advancing technology. Too often these laws, theoretically enacted specifically to support the process of informed consent to genetic testing, constrain and confound as much as clarify. We must aim to protect scientific progress for our patients, as well as to promote the biospecimen and data donations that will enable better health decision-making and outcomes for our future patients. Reform efforts and further research are needed to ensure that state law protections advance as rapidly as the science they aspire to enable. 
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